ABSTRACT Additive manufacturing systems have unique security requirements. In addition to traditional system integrity, additive systems need additional guarantees of part authenticity and confidentiality. When a part comes out of additive manufacture, it must be the exact desired part, without substitution or tampering. In addition, the associated files must be strongly protected from disclosure. The use of hardware roots of trust like a trusted platform module (TPM) to protect authentication and encryption keys can guarantee that the necessary authentication and encryption cannot be subverted by remote software attack. For example, if the additive machine is hardened with a TPM, the TPM can provide an encryption key pair where the private key never leaves the hardware. If the part file is encrypted under the corresponding public key, then it can only be decrypted on the authorized printer, and only if that printer's software has not been compromised. Similarly, a part file can be signed by a private key in the TPM, and when validated by the corresponding public key, the authenticity is assured by hardware. This paper provides the first worked examples of how such hardware rooted protections can be integrated into existing additive manufacturing flows to dramatically strengthen protection of the authenticity, confidentiality, and availability of additive manufacturing files.
I. INTRODUCTION
In ''Adaptive Manufacturing Whitepaper'' [2] , DHS outlined the application specific security challenges faced by digitally connected manufacturing, including additive manufacturing systems. Three of the critical challenges they listed are nation state sponsored attacks including:
• ''Manipulation of manufacturing processes to introduce vulnerabilities and flaws for economic, issue motivated, political, or military purposes''
• ''Theft of trade secrets and intellectual property for economic advantage''
• ''Manipulation or disruption of manufacturing processes and the supply chain for economic, issue motivated, political or military purposes'' These specific challenges correspond to the authenticity, confidentiality, and availability of parts as they flow through the additive manufacturing process. These challenges are particularly difficult, as the additive manufacturing application pipeline is often widely distributed, with a combination of enterprise, cloud, and printer located computation.
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Protecting the authenticity, confidentiality, and availability against nations state level attack is a daunting challenge.
One helpful characteristic of additive manufacturing, particularly metal-additive for military and critical infrastructure systems is that these additive systems are large and expensive, so physical security is typically already handled well. In most cases we can concentrate on remote attacks, including supply chain attacks before installation, and remote network attacks after installation.
II. AN EDGE TO CLOUD SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Additive systems are one example of industrial control edge systems which are increasingly being connected to centralized cloud processing. Such edge to cloud architectures provide flexibility, so that computation can be flexibly scaled, and so that data analytics can operate on enterprise wide data. GE Research has led GE's effort to develop a secure Edge Ecosystem for our next generation of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) targeting Critical Infrastructure applications [3] . This environment integrates edge devices around industrial assets such as controllers and gateways with the customer's cloud, resulting in a truly integrated Edge to Cloud system as shown in Figure. 
FIGURE 2.
Chain of trust. A chain of trust is rooted in the TPM hardware. The chain of trust is layered from hardware, through firmware and software layers to an attestation service with a blockchain-based anchor at the top. This architecture uses hardware roots of trust to verify and attest to the integrity of system components such as the firmware, hypervisor and virtual machines, operating system kernel, libraries, containers, applications and configuration files at boot-time and run-time.
One central feature of this architecture is the use of containerized applications, which can easily flow between the cloud and the edge. The use of containerized applications which can be run in the cloud or in the Edge controller provides not only scalability of processing power, but also provides an inherent flexibility to recover from availability attacks. The architecture uses enabling security standards, technologies and services to support both large, and small-scale critical infrastructure applications. It covers all phases, from trusted supply chains for hardware and software, through initial system deployment, as well as on-going ICS operations and life-cycle management.
The security infrastructure is comprised of mature technologies, scalable and relevant to a diverse-segment set of critical infrastructure ICS applications, including additive, water, power generation, energy transmission & distribution, oil & gas infrastructure, Smart Cities, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and healthcare networks.
Chain of Trust: With the range of threats to critical infrastructure, it is insufficient to harden security at any one level, such as relying solely on network segmentation and intrusion detection. A comprehensive secure software architecture on each node starts with a hardware root of trust then extends up through the software layers. A hardware root of trust is essential, as unlike software, it is immutable, and cannot be circumvented by a software-based attack. Our approach applies a layered design that uses built-in security capabilities at each layer, with coordinated semantics between the layers as well as with the overall edge to cloud security architecture. The coordinated semantics creates a ''Chain of Trust''.
While current network-based defenses attempt to safeguard from a large, untrusted, network-wide attack surface in a perimeter-based approach, a chain of trust approach is rooted in the lower, smaller and more trusted layers on each device. An ICS device's boot and runtime trustworthiness are assessed starting from a hardware-based root of trust. This assessment is done by verifying and attesting to the device's component during boot time and continuing at runtime. Verification is done by checking a component's digital signature and disallowing it to run if the check fails. Attesting is done by creating and securely storing a cryptographic hash of the component before it runs then using the attestation values to set policies based on the component's identity and its integrity [4] .
A chain of trust provides real-time protection and detection of malicious changes to a system. It focuses on unauthorized changes to the persistent state (such as files), regardless of what specific attack was used to alter the files. Rather than relying on malware detection by software running on the system, which itself may be compromised, the chain of trust relies on the established trust of lower layers (starting at the hardware) and performs an attestation operation to services outside the reach of the device's software thereby providing proof of tampering when it occurs. As attestation uses a hardware based secure storage location, which is tamper-proof from any of the device's software (including fully privileged software), compromise cannot remain hidden.
Our approach is to use a standards-based dedicated security hardware component -the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 1 as the hardware-based root of trust. Each TPM contains a unique ''Endorsement'' public key pair where the public part is cryptographically bound to the hardware with a certificate signed by the TPM manufacturer. (The private key is never visible externally to the chip). A Platform Certificate 2 is similarly bound to an ICS and its TPM's key with a signature by the ICS device's manufacturer. This is the starting point for the device's chain of trust providing assurance that the chain of trust is starting from an authentic and trusted device (not counterfeit or altered). The chain of trust continues, using the TPM's secure storage and other key and policies to support attestation. As the chain of trust continues at runtime, it both verifies digital signatures on files and records and stores an attestation record of that verification into the TPM. Those verifications can be digitally signed by the TPM and sent as attestation to a central attestation server which supports remote attestation. The centralized server can, therefore, monitor the integrity of all ICS including their software components mentioned above. As part of this architecture, the attestation server itself is anchored with a blockchain, which provides compromise detection for the attestation server. The chain of trust utilizes key processor features and board hardware for secure and measured boot, extensions to hypervisors and operating systems for runtime signature verification and measurement, hardware key management for secure communication, HSM services for PKI and code signing, and centralized attestation verification.
III. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING THREAT MODEL
Additive systems bring additional security requirements to the set. In addition to traditional system integrity, authenticity and confidentiality are equally important. When a part comes out of additive manufacture, it must be the exact desired part, without substitution or tampering. In addition, the associated files must be strongly protected from disclosure. Fortunately, the previously described security architecture is a solid foundation for these additional requirements. The use of hardware roots of trust like the TPM to protect authentication and encryption keys can guarantee that the necessary authentication and encryption cannot be subverted by remote attack. 1 The TPM and its relevant supporting specifications are developed by the Trusted Computing Group. The TPM specification is an ISO standard. 2 A Platform Certificate provides characteristics about the platform (such as manufacturer, model and serial number, etc.).
For example, if an additive manufacturing printer is hardened with a TPM, the TPM can provide an encryption key pair where the private key never leaves the hardware. If the part file is encrypted under the corresponding public key, then it can only be decrypted on this specific printer, and only if this printer's software has not been compromised. (Section IV gives a detailed example of how this TPM based encryption and decryption is done.) A remote attacker cannot obtain a copy of the decryption private key, and therefore cannot decrypt the additive file. Similarly, a part file can be signed by a private key in the TPM, and when validated by the corresponding public key, the authenticity is guaranteed by hardware.
TPM based keys can also be protected against compromise of the printer itself. The TPM has Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) which can be used to store the integrity state of the system, and these PCRs can be used to limit the use of a given private key to chosen PCR values representing a known good state. The PCRs are maintained as part of secure and measured boot, and as part of Linux's Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA [5] ). If the remote attacker manages to modify any part of the boot sequence, then the PCRs will be different, and the TPM will refuse to use the private key to decrypt the additive files.
IV. USING A TPM TO PROTECT ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING FILES
Given an Edge to Cloud architecture based on containers, with each node protected with a chain of trust anchored in a TPM, what is necessary to extend the chain of trust up to the additive manufacturing applications? In the past, this has been difficult, as the TPMs have been undergoing a painful transition from version 1 to version 2, and the entire kernel and library stack has been in transition. Fortunately, this transition is complete, and it is now relatively simple for the application layer to integrate TPM based protections for additive files.
The following section demonstrates the simple Linux commands which can authenticate and encrypt additive files using a TPM. The example assumes that the user has an additive part file and wants to send it to an authorized printer in a secure way, so that a remote attacker cannot read or tamper the part. The example is shown in three scripts: one for initial provisioning of the TPM keys on both client and printer: keys for the client to encrypt and then sign the file, and keys for the printer to verify the authentication, and then decrypt the file.
These scripts were tested on a an up to date copy of Fedora 29. The only prerequisites are that the system must have a TPM 2.0, which is common for most modern laptops, and the package tpm2-tools [6] must be installed (''dnf install tpm2-tools''). For simplicity in the example, all operations are run on one system, with the ''client'' and ''printer'' contexts stored in separate directories, but both sharing the single TPM instance. It would be simple to extend the example to handle the more realistic case of separate client VOLUME 7, 2019 and printer systems, by changing the ''cp'' local commands to ''scp'' for secure remote copy.
A. PROVISIONING
In provisioning, the client and printer TPMs must first create primary keys under which new keys can be used. Then on the client, a signature key is created, and on the printer, an encryption key is created. The corresponding public keys are copied to the other context. 
B. CLIENT SIDE -ENCRYPT AND SIGN A FILE FOR THE PRINTER
On the client side, we first create a dummy text file. This file is signed by the TPM. Then a random ephemeral AES encryption key is created, and it is used to encrypt the file with openssl. The AES key is then encrypted under the public (TPM) key of the printer. The encrypted file, the signature, and the encrypted AES key are then copied to the printer. While it is normally preferred to encrypt then authenticate, in this example we authenticate then encrypt. This ordering may be preferred in the additive case, to support potential multiple encrypt and decrypt stages in the Edge to Cloud environment, while preserving the original authentication.
cd client # make a dummy file to send to the printer (echo -e "DUMMY FILE"; openssl rand -hex \ 512) > printme.txt # Sign File tpm2_sign -V -c PKc.ctx -g sha256 -m \ printme.txt -f plain -s printme.sig # generate ephemeral bulk encryption key openssl rand -hex 32 > SKeph # encrypt the dummy file with this key openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -in printme.txt \ -out printme.enc -k 'cat SKeph' -pbkdf2 # encrypt key with printer's public key tpm2_loadexternal -Q -H o -u PKp.pub \ -C primaryc.ctx tpm2_rsaencrypt -Q -c primaryc.ctx \ -o SKephPKp < SKeph # Send Additive Files to Printer cp printme.sig printme.enc SKephPKp \ ../printer
C. PRINTER SIDE
On the printer side, the TPM decrypts the AES key, and this key is used to decrypt the additive data file. Openssl is then used to verify the client TPM's signature on the data file. 
V. MORE ADVANCED PROTECTIONS
The previous example was simple, to show how easy it is for additive manufacturing applications to use the TPM to protect additive manufacturing files. In real additive systems, there are additional advanced protections that are also possible. These include:
1. Integrity Policies: This simple example does not demonstrate the use of the TPM's policies. The TPM can bind policies to keys, such as for the signing and encryption keys used in the example. Policies can specify PCR values that must be true for the keys to be usable. In a simple case, a policy might specify values for the boot time PCRs (0 through 7). If an attacker modifies any component in the boot sequence, then the TPM will refuse to allow any use of the keys bound by that policy. Thus, if an attacker attempts to modify the printer code to capture a copy of the unencrypted part file on the printer, the modification itself can prevent the decryption of the file and thwart the attack. 2. Protection against supply chain attacks: TCG has developed standards for ''TPM certificates'' and ''Platform Certificates'', which can be used in conjunction with a TPM to verify a platform against supply chain attacks. The basic approach is for the TPM vendor to create a public key certificate signed by the vendor, and tied to a fixed, unique private key in each TPM. The TPM can prove that it has the corresponding private key, and thus prove that it is a valid TPM from the vendor. The system vendor can then create a platform certificate that they sign that binds the TPM certificate to additional platform properties, such as integrity measurements. The platform certificate and the TPM can then be used to verify that these properties have not changed in a supply chain attack. 3. Assured pipeline: Additive applications are typically not a simple single step client-to-printer operation. The operations can be split across multiple steps, across multiple client, cloud, Edge, and printer systems. The simple example given can easily be extended to an assured pipeline. So long as each system in the application pipeline has access to a TPM, each step can sign its output with its TPM, and encrypt it under the TPM for the next step. 4. Provenance: In multiple step additive application pipelines, a provenance file can be created, each application step can append a summary of its operation and sign the resultant complete file with its TPM. The resultant file will contain hardware rooted proof of the complete provenance of the part through the entire additive process.
VI. ANALYSIS
The use of TPM based keys to protect the additive files can defeat several categories of attacks. It will protect against the attacker stealing the private signature and encryption keys, and thus being able to read and tamper the additive files directly. With key policies, the TPM can protect against the use of keys on the authorized machines if software on the machines has been tampered, thus protecting the parts against reading and tampering on authorized, but compromised, systems. With platform certificates, the TPM can provide hardware rooted assurance that the platform itself has not been tampered with in delivery between the trusted OEM and the customer. These protections can be composed into assured pipelines across multiple stages of additive processing. The TPM can provide a hardware rooted provenance listing all processing done in such an assured pipeline. TPM protections do have limits. Measurement systems such as measured boot and IMA measure persistent state, such as files, and do not attempt to measure the internal state of running processes. If an attacker can compromise a running process, such as with a data driven attack, the TPM will not know of the compromise. In addition, the TPM may not provide timely notification of compromise. In general, it will not be aware of file compromise until the next attempt to access or execute the file, which may not be until the next reboot.
VII. SUMMARY
In addition to traditional system integrity, additive systems need additional guarantees of part authenticity, confidentiality, and availability. The use of hardware roots of trust like a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to protect authentication and encryption keys can provide assurance that the necessary authentication and encryption cannot be subverted by remote software attack. The TPM can provide an encryption key pair where the private key never leaves the hardware. If the part file is encrypted under the corresponding public key, then it can only be decrypted on the authorized printer, and only if that printer's software has not been compromised. Similarly, a part file can be signed by a private key in the TPM, and when validated by the corresponding public key, the authenticity is assured by hardware. Integrating such hardware rooted protections into existing additive flows can dramatically strengthen protection of the authenticity, confidentiality, and availability of additive part files.
